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Abstract
I characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium of a diﬀerential market game
with hyperbolic demand where firms are quantity-setters and accumulate ca-
pacity over time a` la Ramsey. I show that the open-loop solution is subgame
perfect. Then, I analyse the feasibility of horizontal mergers, and compare
the result generated by the dynamic setup with the merger incentive asso-
ciated with the static model. It appears that allowing for the role of time
makes mergers more likely to occur than they would on the basis of the
static setting.
JEL Classification: C73, L13
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1 Introduction
Most of the existing literature on oligopoly theory (either static or dynamic)
assumes linear demand functions, as this, in addition to simplifying calcu-
lations, also ensures both concavity and unicity of the equilibrium, which,
in general, wouldn’t be warranted in presence of convex demand systems
(see Friedman, 1977; and Dixit, 1986, inter alia). However, the use of
linear demand function is in sharp contrast with the standard microeco-
nomic approach to consumer behavior, where the widespread adoption of
Cobb-Douglas preferences (or their log-linear aﬃne transformation) yields
hyperbolic demand functions. The same applies to the so-called quasi-linear
utility function, concave in consumption and linear in money, that again
yields a convex demand system. Indeed, both preference structures share
the common property of producing isoelastic demand functions.1 In fact,
this is sometimes openly referred to in the field of industrial organization,
where researchers mentions the opportunity of dealing with non-linear de-
mand functions, and then promptly leave it aside for the sake of tractability.2
Additionally, the econometric approach to demand theory has produced the
highest eﬀorts to building up a robust approach to the estimation of non-
linear individual and market demand functions, yielding a large empirical
evidence in this direction.3 With these considerations in mind, it appears
desirable to investigate the bearings of non-linear demand systems on the
performance of firms operating in oligopolistic markets, using thus a setup
with solid microfoundations corroborated by robust empirical evidence, even
though this is a costly approach in terms of analytical tractability.
1For a thourough illustration of these issues in consumer theory, see the classical
textbooks of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), and Varian (1992), inter alia.
2A noteworthy example in this respect is Shy (1995, pp. 53-54), using quasi-linear
utility function to define the concept of consumer surplus.
3See Hausman (1981) and Varian (1982, 1990), inter alia.
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With specific reference to diﬀerential games, the use of linear demand
functions (jointly with either linear or quadratic cost functions) allows for
the closed-form solution of the feedback equilibrium through the Bellman
equation of the representative firm, as the model takes a linear-quadratic
form and therefore one can stipulate that the corresponding candidate value
function is also linear-quadratic. However, there is no particular reason
to believe that a linear function describes correctly virtually any market
demand in the real world, and therefore it is of primary interest to design,
if possible, closed-form solutions of market games with non-linear demand
functions.4
The aim of this paper is to illustrate a way out of the aforementioned
problem, oﬀered by dynamic game theory. I illustrate a dynamic Cournot
model where firms (i) accumulate capacity a` la Ramsey (1928), (ii) bear an
instantaneous cost of holding any given capacity, and (iii) discount future
profits at a constant rate. The main results are threefold. First, I show
that the resulting open-loop equilibrium is indeed subgame perfect as it is
a (degenerate) feedback equilibrium. Secondly, a straightforward feature of
the equilibrium is that - unlike the static game - it admits an economically
sensible solution even in the limit case where the marginal production cost
of the consumption good drops to zero. This is entirely due to the dynamic
nature of this setup. Finally, I use it to investigate the profit (or, private)
incentive towards horizontal mergers, to find that taking a dynamic perspec-
tive widens the range of privately feasible mergers.5 That is, the presence of
4To the best of my knowledge, the only existing examples of diﬀerential oligopoly games
with non-linear market demand are in Cellini and Lambertini (2007) and Lambertini
(2010). The first uses a non-linear demand a` la Anderson and Engers (1992) and also
investigates horizontal mergers. The second uses a hyperbolic demand with sticky prices
(as in Simaan and Takayama, 1978; and Fershtman and Kamien, 1987), but leaves the
merger issue out of the picture.
5To the best of my knoweldge, scanty attention has been devoted to the implications of
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discounting, depreciation and a cost associated to holding capacity increases
the firms’ willingness to merge horizontally as compared to the static setup,
for any admissible merger size. Any merger, of course, has undesirable con-
sequences on consumer surplus and ultimately for welfare (at least in this
model, where the eﬃciency defense is not operating).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. the static game is
briefly summed up in section 2. Section 3 laids out the dynamic setting.
The Cournot-Ramsey game is solved in section 3, while the profitability of
horizontal mergers is investigated in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 A summary of the static game
Consider a market whereN single-product firms supply individual quantities
qi, i = 1, 2, 3, ...N. The good is homogeneous, and market demand is p =
a/Q, Q =
PN
i=1 qi. This demand function is the outcome of the constrained
maximum problem of a representative consumer endowed with a log-linear
utility function
U = Log [Q] +m (2.1)
where m is a numeraire good whose price is normalised to one. The budget
constraint establishes that the consumer’s nominal income Y must be large
enough to cover the expenditure, so that Y ≥ pQ +m. The representative
consumer must
max
Q
L = U + µ (Y − pQ−m) . (2.2)
dynamic competition on merger incentives, with the exceptions of Dockner and Gauners-
dorfer (2001) and Benchekroun (2003), using a price dynamics a` la Simaan and Takayama
(1978) and Cellini and Lambertini (2007) adopting a Ramsey-type capital accumulation
dynamics. All of these contrivutions, however, assume linear demand functions.
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Solving the above problem, one obtains indeed the hyperbolic demand func-
tion p = a/Q.
On the supply side, production entails a total cost Ci = cqi, where c >
0 is a constant parameter measuring marginal production cost. Market
competition takes place a` la Cournot-Nash; therefore, firm i chooses qi so as
to maximise profits πi = (p− c) qi. This entails that the following first order
condition must be satisfied (assuming interior solutions):
∂πi
∂qi
=
aQ−i
(qi +Q−i)
2 − c = 0 (2.3)
where Q−i ≡
P
j 6=i qj. The associated second order condition:
∂2πi
∂q2i
= −
2a
P
j 6= qj
(qi +Q−i)
3 ≤ 0 (2.4)
is always met. then, imposing the symmetry condition qi = q for all
qi = 1, 2, 3, ...N, one obtains the individual Cournot-Nash equilibrium out-
put qCN = a (n− 1) / (N2c) , yielding profits πCN = a/N2. If the N firms
were operating under perfect competition, then p∗ = c and therefore q∗ =
a/ (Nc) .
It is apparent that the above solutions (i.e., both the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium and the perfectly competitive equilibrium) are determinate for all
c > 0, while they become indeterminate in correspondence of c = 0.
Now I will turn my attention to a diﬀerential game where demand, cost,
and profits are the same as here but firms accumulate productive capacity
in a Ramsey fashion.
3 The dynamic setup
The market exists over t ∈ [0 , ∞) , and is served by N firms producing a
homogeneous good. Let qi(t) define the quantity sold by firm i at time t.
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Firms compete a` la Cournot, the demand function at time t being:
p (t) =
a
Q (t)
, Q (t) =
NX
i=1
qi (t) ; a > 0. (3.1)
In order to produce, firms bear quadratic instantaneous costs Ci (t) = cqi (t) .
Moreover, they must accumulate capacity or physical capital ki(t) over time.
The two models I consider in the present paper are characterised by two
diﬀerent kinematic equations for capital accumulation as in Ramsey (1928),
with the following dynamic equation:
dki(t)
dt
≡
·
ki = Aki(t)− qi(t)− δki(t) , (3.2)
where Aki(t) = yi(t) denotes the output produced by firm i at time t. I.e.,
this is the familiar A−k version of the Ramsey model. Capital accumulates
as a result of intertemporal relocation of unsold output yi(t) − qi(t).6 This
can be interpreted in two ways. The first consists in viewing this setup as
a corn-corn model, where unsold output is reintroduced in the production
process. The second consists in thinking of a two-sector economy where there
exists an industry producing the capital input which can be traded against
the final good at a price equal to one (for further discussion, see Cellini and
Lambertini, 2007). Unlike the standard macroeconomic approach to the
Ramsey growth model, here I will allow for the presence of an instantaneous
cost of holding installed capacity. This cost will be Γi (t) = bki(t), with
b ≥ 0. In the remainder, I will refer to b as a measure of the opportunity
cost of a unit of capacity. The control variable is qi(t), while the state
variable is ki(t).
Assuming all firms discount profits at the same constant rate ρ ≥ 0, the
problem of firm i is to choose the output level qi (t) so as to maximisize its
6Of course, capacity decumulates whenever yi(t)− qi(t) ≤ 0.
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own discounted profits:
Πi (k (t) ,q (t)) ,
½Z ∞
0
[p (t)− c] qi (t)− bki(t)
¾
e−ρtdt (3.3)
s.t. the price dynamics (3.2) and the initial conditions ki (0) = ki0. k (t)
and q (t) are the vector of all firms’ states and controls, respectively. In
order to make the model consistent with the corresponding macroeconomic
approach, I will set A > δ + ρ.
4 The Cournot-Ramsey game
Here I will illustrate the open-loop solution of a generic firm in the industry.
The Hamiltonian of firm i is:
Hi (k (t) ,q (t)) = e−ρt
(
aqi (t)
qi(t) +
P
j 6=i qj(t)
− cqi (t)− bki(t) (4.1)
+λii (t) [Aki (t)− qi(t)− δki(t)]
+
X
j 6=i
λij (t) [Akj (t)− qj(t)− δkj(t)]
)
where λij (t) = µij (t) e
ρt, µij (t) being the co-state variable that firm i asso-
ciates to kij (t) .
The first order condition on control qi (t) is:7
∂Hi (·)
∂qi (t)
=
a
P
j 6= qj(t)h
qi(t) +
P
j 6= qj(t)
i2 − c− λii (t) = 0; (4.2)
−∂Hi (·)
∂ki (t)
=
·
λii (t)− ρλii (t)⇔
7Exponential discounting is omitted for the sake of brevity.
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·
λii (t) = b− λii (t) (A− ρ− δ) (4.3)
with the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλii (t) ki (t) = 0. (4.4)
At this point, it is worth noting that the N−1 co-state equations pertaining
to any λij (t) , with j 6= i, are omitted as they are irrelevant due to the fact
that the game exhibits separate state equations, i.e., the state dynamics of
any firm is independent of the rivals’ states and controls. Hence, any co-state
equation
−∂Hi (·)
∂kj (t)
=
·
λij (t)− ρλij (t) (4.5)
indeed admits the solution λij (t) = 0 at all times, for all j 6= i.
This, together with the fact that the Hamiltonian function (4.1) of the
generic firm i is linear in the vector of states k (t) , immediately implies the
following result:8
Proposition 4.1. The diﬀerential game is a linear state one. Therefore,
the open-loop equilibrium is subgame perfect as it coincides with the feedback
equilibrium yielded by the Bellman equation.
Proof. See Appendix 1.¥
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that comparing (4.2) and (2.3), one
immediately sees that the presence of capital accumulation in the dynamic
game plays a key role in opening the way towards a solution to the inde-
terminacy issue aﬀecting the static game as marginal cost c tends to zero,
8Proposition 4.1 would hold true also in the more general case where yi (t) = f (ki (t)) ,
with f 0 (ki (t)) > 0 and f 00 (ki (t)) ≤ 0. That is, state-linearity is not necessary to yield
subgame perfection in a Cournot-Ramsey game. I am using the A − k version just to
simplify the exposition. For more on this issue, see Cellini and Lambertini (1998, 2008).
7
precisely because of the fact that the co-state variable that firm i attaches to
its own capacity accumulation dynamics enters the FOC on the investment
control. I.e., (4.2) admits a viable solution even if c = 0, provided λii (t) is
non-nil. As we will see in the reminder, this is precisely the case.
From (4.2), one obtains the expression of the co-state variable λii:9
λii =
a
P
j 6=i qj³
qi +
P
j 6= qj
´2 − c. (4.6)
Then, diﬀerentiating the above expression w.r.t. time yields:
·
λii =
a
P
j 6=i
·
qj³
qi +
P
j 6=i qj
´2 − 2a
P
j 6=i qj
³ ·
qi +
P
j 6=i
·
qj
´
³
qi +
P
j 6=i qj
´3 (4.7)
which, using (4.6) and imposing symmetry across control, state and co-state
variables, yields the following control dynamics:
·
q =
q [a (N − 1) (A− ρ− δ) +N2q (c (A− ρ− δ)− b)]
a (N − 1) . (4.8)
Now observe that, if b = 0, the above equation becomes
·
q =
q [a (N − 1)− cN2q] (A− ρ− δ)
a (N − 1) , (4.9)
with the stationarity condition
·
q = 0 being satisfied by
q = 0 ; eq = a (N − 1)
cN2
; A = ρ+ δ, (4.10)
where (i) q = 0 implies that firms don’t sell, and therefore their equilibrium
profits are obviously nil; the second solution, eq, coincides with that of the
9In the remainder of the paper, I will omit the explicit indication of the time argument
for brevity.
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static game illustrated in section 2, and therefore is an acceptable solution
only if marginal cost c is strictly positive; and f 0(k) = ρ+ δ is the Ramsey
golden rule.
Instead, for all b > 0, The Ramsey solution disappears and imposing the
stationarity condition on (4.8) yields:
q = 0; bq = a (N − 1) (A− ρ− δ)
N2 [b+ c (A− ρ− δ)] (4.11)
with the second solution being admissible even if c were nil. The above
solution immediately proves the following:
Remark 4.1. The steady state output of the diﬀerential game is admissible
for all c, including c = 0.
The output bq can be plugged into (3.2) to impose stationarity on the
capital accumulation process. This yields:
k =
a (N − 1) (A− ρ− δ)
N2 [b+ c (A− ρ− δ)] (A− δ) . (4.12)
Moreover,
eq − bq = a (N − 1) b
N2 [b+ c (A− ρ− δ)] c > 0∀b > 0, (4.13)
showing that the static Cournot-Nash output is strictly larger than the open-
loop (or feedback) equilibrium output for all positive levels of the opportu-
nity cost b.
Using bq, steady state individual profits simplify as follows:
πss =
a [(A− δ) (A− ρ− δ) + ρ (b (N − 1)− c (A− δ))]
N2 [b+ c (A− ρ− δ)] (A− δ) , (4.14)
with
πss − πCN = ab (N − 1) ρ
N2 [b+ c (A− ρ− δ)] (A− δ) > 0 (4.15)
for all positive b, ρ. Hence, I may state:
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Proposition 4.2. At the subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game,
with
kss =
a (N − 1) (A− ρ− δ)
N2 [b+ c (A− ρ− δ)] (A− δ) ; q
ss =
a (N − 1) (A− ρ− δ)
N2 [b+ c (A− ρ− δ)]
the representative firm produces less and earns higher profits than at the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the static game, for all positive levels of the
discount rate and opportunity cost.
There remain to assess the stability properties of the steady state equi-
librium:
Proposition 4.3. The steady state solution
kss =
a (N − 1) (A− ρ− δ)
N2 [b+ c (A− ρ− δ)] (A− δ) ; q
ss =
a (N − 1) (A− ρ− δ)
N2 [b+ c (A− ρ− δ)]
is a saddle point equilibrium for all A > δ + ρ.
Proof. See Appendix 2.¥
Having characterised the subgame perfect equilibrium of the diﬀerential
game, I may now proceed to the analysis of its application to horizontal
mergers.
5 Application: horizontal mergers
To illustrate the advantages of our approach to the feedback solution of the
diﬀerential oligopoly game a` la Ramsey, we illustrate here its applicability
to the analysis of the private profitability of a horizontal merger, and its
welfare appraisal.
As is well known, a lively debate has taken place on this topic from
the 1980’s, based upon static oligopoly models. A thorough overview of it
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is outside the scope of the present paper, and it will suﬃce to recollect a
few essential aspects. Examining a Cournot industry with constant returns
to scale, Salant et al. (1983) have shown that a large proportion of the
population of firms has to participate in the merger in order for the latter to
be profitable. In particular, a striking result of their analysis is that, in the
triopoly case, bilateral mergers are never profitable. Enriching the picture
by allowing for the presence of convex variable costs and fixed costs, one
may find a way out of this puzzle (see Perry and Porter, 1985; and Farrell
and Shapiro, 1990).
Now take the static Cournot game and examine the incentive forM firms
to merge horizontally, out of the initial N. After the merger (if it does take
place), there remain N −M + 1 firms. The merger is profitable iﬀ
πCN (N −M + 1)
M
=
a2
M (N −M + 1)2
> πCN (N) =
a
N2
(5.1)
that is, iﬀ
N2 −M2 +M (2N + 1) > 0 (5.2)
which holds for all
M ∈
µ
1 + 2N −
√
4N + 1
2
,
1 + 2N +
√
4N + 1
2
¶
. (5.3)
It is easily checked that, if N = 3 and M = 2, the merger is profitable.
If instead we consider the steady state outcome of the diﬀerential game,
the profit incentive for an M -firm merger is measured by
πss (N −M + 1)
M
> πss (N) . (5.4)
The above condition is satisfied for all
M ∈
µ
1
2
+N −
√
Ψ,
1
2
+N +
√
Ψ
¶
(5.5)
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where
Ψ ≡ [b+ c (A− δ) (A− ρ− δ) +Nbρ] [cδ (ρ+ δ) (4N + 1)+ (5.6)
A ((b− c (2δ + ρ)) (4N + 1) +Ac) (4N + 1)− b (δ + ρ+N (4δ + 3ρ))] .
Next, one can compare the interval (5.5) against (5.3), to verify the following
properties:
∂
³
1/2 +N +
√
Ψ
´
∂b
∝ −cN2 (A− δ) (A− ρ− δ) ρ < 0 (5.7)
∂
³
1/2 +N −
√
Ψ
´
∂b
∝ cN2 (A− δ) (A− ρ− δ) ρ > 0 (5.8)
lim
b→0
1
2
+N +
√
Ψ =
1 + 2N +
√
4N + 1
2
(5.9)
lim
b→0
1
2
+N −
√
Ψ =
1 + 2N −
√
4N + 1
2
(5.10)
Taken together, these facts entail that the interval wherein the M-firm
merger is profitable is wider in the dynamic setup than in the static one.
Only in the limit, where the opportunity cost of holding installed capacity
drops to zero, these two intervals do coincide.10 This ultimately entails that
taking properly into account (i) the possibility that firms accumulate capac-
ity, and (ii) the related aspect that this is in general a costly activity, reveals
that horizontal mergers appearing unfeasible in the static game become fea-
sible in the dynamic one. The examination of the welfare consequences of a
merger is omitted, as it goes without saying that any merger would diminish
social welfare, both in the static as well as in the dynamic setting. This is
10Conversely, the same result applies, for all b > 0, by setting either ρ = 0 or taking
the limit for ρ growing up to infinity.
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trivially due to the fact that the damage caused to consumer surplus always
outweighs the increase in industry profits.11
6 Concluding remarks
I have characterised the subgame perfect equilibrium of a dynamic Cournot
game with hyperbolic demand and costly capacity accumulation, showing
that the open-loop solution is subgame perfect. Then, I have employed the
model to analyse the feasibility of horizontal mergers, and compare the result
stemming from the steady state of the diﬀerential game against the merger
incentive associated with the static version of the model. There emerges
that allowing for the role of time in determining firms’ incentives as to their
optimal long-run size makes mergers, in general, more likely to take place
(and therefore more dangerous) than they would be if judging on the basis
of the static approach.
11In line of principle, a merger could allow for some reduction in the total opportunity
costs for the industry, giving rise to a possible eﬃciency defense argument (see Farrell
and Shapiro, 1990). Although I omit the related calculations for brevity, it is quickly
checked that this never outweighs the loss in consumer suplus necessarily generated by
any merger. Hence, in this model the eﬃciency argument cannot be advocated to justify
the merger itself.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 4.1
The observation that the diﬀerential game under consideration is indeed
a linear state one suﬃces to prove the claim.12 However, it is interesting
to show that the game is indeed solvable using the corresponding Bellman
equation:13
ρVi (k) = max
qi
Ã
πi +
∂Vi (k)
∂ki
+
X
j 6=i
∂Vi (k)
∂kj
!
(a1)
with a linear value function, notwithstanding the presence of a non-linear
demand function.
To prove this result, take
Vi (k) = eiki +
X
j 6=i
ejkj + θ, (a2)
so that ∂Vi (k) /∂ki = ei for all i. The first order condition taken on (a1) is:
a
P
j 6= qj(t)h
qi(t) +
P
j 6= qj(t)
i2 − c− ei = 0 (a3)
i.e., the same as (4.2) except for the appearance of ei in place of the co-state
λii (I’ll come back to this aspect in the remainder of the proof).
12A linear state game is one where (using the same symbols as in this paper, to indicate
states and controls):
∂2Hi (·)
∂qi (t) ∂kj (t)
=
∂2Hi (·)
∂k2j (t)
= 0
for all i, j. For more on linear state games, see Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 7), inter alia.
13Throughout the Appendix, I will omit the explicit indication of the time argument
for brevity.
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To proceed with the analytical solution of the feedback problem, I intro-
duce two symmetry conditions: one is qi = qj for all j, while the other one is
kj = k (and also ej = e) for all j 6= i. The former says that the equilibrium
output must be symmetric across all firms, the second states that, from the
standpoint of a generic firm i, the rivals’ capacities (and therefore also their
weights in the value function) must be symmetric. In introducing the second
condition I explicitly refrain from setting ki = kj = k and ei = ej = e as
the relative weight of firm i’s capacity is in its own right diﬀerent from the
rivals’. By doing so I would unduly introduce some degree of collusion in a
game that is strictly noncooperative.
Using the symmetry condition on quantities, (a3) yields:
q∗i =
a (N − 1)
N2 (c+ ei)
(a4)
so that (a2) can be rewritten as follows:
ki [b− ei (A− δ − ρ)]− k [(A− δ) (N − 1)− 2ρ] e+
+
N2 (c+ ei) θρ− a
£
c+ ei − e (N + 1)2
¤
N2 (c+ ei)
= 0 (a5)
giving rise to a system of three equations:
N2 (c+ ei) θρ− a
£
c+ ei − e (N + 1)2
¤
= 0
[(A− δ) (N − 1)− 2ρ] e = 0 (a6)
[b− ei (A− δ − ρ)] = 0
to be solved w.r.t. the coeﬃcients of the Bellman equation, ei, e and θ. This
yields:
θ =
a
£
c+ ei − e (N + 1)2
¤
N2 (c+ ei) ρ
; e = 0; ei =
b
A− δ − ρ . (a7)
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Hence, the resulting feedback equilibrium output is
qF =
a (N − 1) (A− ρ− δ)
N2 [b+ c (A− ρ− δ)] = q
ss (a8)
and obviously the optimal capacity endowment at the feedback equilibrium
coincides with kss.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 4.1. As an ancillary observation,
it is worth noting that here, precisely because the open-loop solution is
indeed a degenerate feedback one, the co-state variable λii appearing in the
open-loop formulation of the game can be appropriately considered as a
shadow price (of an additional unit of capacity, in the present setup), while,
in general, this is true only of the partial derivative of the value function,
∂Vi (k) /∂ki (for more on this aspect, see Caputo, 2007).¥
Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 4.3
The stability properties of the dynamic state-control system must be evalu-
ated by assessing the trace and determinant of the 2× 2 Jacobian matrix:
J =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂
·
k
∂k
∂
·
k
∂q
∂
·
q
∂k
∂
·
q
∂q
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (a9)
that, in correspondence of the symmetric steady state equilibrium, exhibits
the following determinant:
∆ (J) = − (A− δ) (A− δ − ρ) . (a10)
The above expression is negative for all A > δ + ρ. Accordingly, in such a
range the steady state (kss, qss) is a saddle point equilibrium.¥
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